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ABSTRACT
This article examines three museums that address Lebanon’s history of conflict: the newly
opened Beit Beirut on the capital’s former Green Line, the Hezbollah-run Mleeta Resistance
Tourist Landmark in south Lebanon, and Umam Documentation and Research’s online archive
“Memory at Work.” Each testing the parameters of what the term museum can mean in
Lebanon today, these cases highlight the still-contested nature of war narratives. While many
Lebanese youth express desire for a shared national history of the civil war, the affective com-
plexities of recuperated memorial sites and the inconsistent involvement of the state suggest
that the possibility of publicly staging such a history is far from secure.
Introduction
Almost three decades after the end of Lebanon’s civil war (1975–1990), Beirut has
opened its doors to its first museum and cultural center addressing the history of the
war, Beit Beirut. While its bullet-pocked exterior bears witness to its location along
Beirut’s former Green Line, or “intersection of death” (takaata al-mawt), the lack of
curator or permanent collection evidences Lebanon’s ongoing contestation of its war
memory. Lebanon has been diagnosed by scholars, activists, and artists as suffering
from social amnesia (lost memory), hypomnesia (poor memory), and hypermnesia
(enhanced memory).1
Consequently the search to uncover, learn from, or move beyond the past remains a
highly politicized field shaped by dominant “memory cultures”2 and competing
“regimes of memory”3 vying for representative forms and interpretative power. In the
absence of state-led memorial projects, privately funded museums and archives are
shaping civil war discourses and debates and are responding to Lebanon’s contemporary
political realities. This article examines three distinct initiatives commemorating conflict
in Lebanon—Beit Beirut Museum and Urban Cultural Centre, Mleeta Resistance Tourist
Landmark, and Umam Documentation and Research’s (D&R) “Memory at Work” data-
base4—situating them within internal debates about authenticity and historical truth
and international disputes about the memorialization of trauma, conflict, and pain. This
research results from a decade-long interest in war memory in Lebanon,5 and more
explicitly site observations and semi-structured interviews carried out with museum
founders, curators, artists, activists, and visitors during January–September 2018.
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Ethnographic fieldwork was supplemented by website and secondary-source analysis,
and the creation of an online survey examining the local responses, attitudes, and expe-
riences of Lebanese to war memorials and museums (40 respondents during
January 2018).
Each case study under review tests the parameters of the term museum in ways that
point toward its complexity in contemporary Lebanon. The article therefore begins by
situating the Lebanese case studies within a contemporary genre of museology exempli-
fied by memorials and so-called dark tourism sites across the world, which emphasizes
the decentering of knowledge from rigid pedagogical narratives in favor of the participa-
tory and affective experience of viewers. While seeming to shift the balance of agency
toward visitors, the effects of this move are not unproblematic, because the powerful
affective force of such experiences can foster ideological monopolization. The three
Lebanese museums discussed here are located on sites closely connected to the histories
in question, exacerbating their experiential intensity and narrative force. In the second
section, we discuss how the memorial sites themselves are inscribed with meaning.
Finally, we will look at the implications of these projects for national narratives of war,
in particular focusing on the presence (or indeed, the absence) of the state in each case.
Given the unwillingness of the Lebanese state to participate in or endorse memory-mak-
ing with respect to the civil war, we address how each museum has negotiated its rela-
tionship to the nation and its axes of power, and what this reveals about the current
predicament of war memory in Lebanon.
Memory and war museums in divided societies
Since the early 1990s, a new genre of museums and museology has emerged, entailing a
shift from institutional history and pedagogical instruction to a decentered approach to
knowledge production through oral testimonies and collective mnemonic participation.6
The proliferation of “memorial museums,” often located on physical sites of historic suf-
fering, attests to the growing conflation of commemorative practice and emotive narra-
tivization of the past.7 Holocaust museums can now be found in more than 30, while
similar memorial museums have been created within former prison camps (Perm-36
Gulag, Russia; Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Cambodia), on massacre and burial sites
(The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum, China; Kigali Genocide Memorial,
Rwanda), and on urban spaces of terrorist attacks (9/11 Memorial Museum, New York).
The moral imperative of such museums, according to Silke Arnold-de Simine,
encourages visitors “to empathize and identify with individual sufferers and victims, as
if “reliving” their experience, in order to thus develop more personal and immediate
forms of engagement.”8 The idea of “secondary witnessing”9 as a deterrent against
future violence may be compelling, yet critics have questioned whether such mnemonic
empathy actually fosters “ethical thinking” or “elicits tolerance and deeper under-
standing.”10 As Susan Sontag suggests, “perhaps too much value is assigned to memory,
not enough to thinking.”11 Other commentators accuse such memory projects of leading
to the banalization and commodification of horrific events for mass consumption. The
sale of “Twin Tower” hoodies and Search and Rescue toy dogs at the 9/11 Memorial
Museum gift shop is a case in point.12 Yet the most challenging critique of memorial
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2 C. LARKIN AND E. PARRY-DAVIES
museums surrounds the affective, ideological strategies employed through exhibition
narratives and images.13 In divided and post-conflict societies, where the past remains a
contested field, emotive memorial museums are more often representational battle-
grounds for competing historical narratives, communal identities, and the determination
of society’s victims, heroes, and aggressors.
For Patrizia Violi, the power of such memorial sites derives from their “spatial con-
tiguity with the trauma itself.”14 Such traces provide testimonial authenticity and emo-
tional intensity to be both interpreted and transformed through the visitor’s embodied
experience of the site. A performative understanding of memorial sites and activities
such as historical reenactment sees visitors as active co-creators engaged in cultural
imaginings.15 As such, space not only is acted out through existing narratives and
patterns of behavior but also can be imagined differently. It moves away from the
mnemonic privilege accorded to artifact, monument, and text, instead focusing on
“embodied memory: performances, gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing—in
short, all those acts usually thought of as ephemeral, non-reproducible knowledge.”16 At
memorial sites, space and memory are therefore performed “live” by bodies saturated
with social meaning.
Finally, traumatic memorial sites have increasingly been explained as dark tourism, in
which death, disaster, and atrocity are offered as neoliberal tourist products.17 In
Belfast, ex-paramilitaries now offer tours of murals, peace lines, and former bomb sites
in the Post-Troubles city.18 Religious pilgrims in Bethlehem pay homage at the graffiti-
adorned Separation barrier and visit Banksy’s Walled-off Hotel and Wall Museum.19 In
postwar Lebanon, a recent survey suggests the untapped potential of dark tourism, par-
ticularly among a receptive youth who listed their interest in visiting cemeteries (Rafik
Hariri; Wadih al-Safi and Martyrs’ Cemetery Rawdat Al-Shaheedayn), former prisons
(Khiam), and battle sites (Mleeta).20 Yet why should some sites be termed “dark” and
morbidly voyeuristic while others are privileged as “cultural heritage” or “negative
heritage”?21 Does commodification and commercial exploitation lessen the authenticity
or pedagogical impact of a former conflict site? While it is important to situate
Lebanese war museums against a backdrop of communication and media technology,
the Holocaust museum industry,22 and the marketization of memorial sites, it is essen-
tial to contextualize these sites more precisely to understand their purpose and appeal.
Each of the following case studies will be understood within its own unique historical
trajectory, examining its indexical nature, esthetic structure, and performative capacity.
As Violi astutely observes, the “conservation, transformation and memorialization of
places where slaughter, torture and horror have been carried out are key points for
understanding better the relationship between memory and history in the case of each
post-conflict society.”23
Site and affect
The three Lebanese memorial sites discussed in this article are located on symbolic border-
lines and spatial rupture points: Mleeta is on the fringe of the former Israeli-occupied
security zone in south Lebanon; Beit Beirut is on Beirut’s Green Line wartime division, and
Umam is in the Hezbollah-dominated Dahiyya suburbs of Beirut. These settings are not
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NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 3
coincidental but are integral to each museum’s mnemonic narrative, allowing events to be
“inscribed with salience and meaning, and episodes and actions (and omissions) [to be]
repositioned in relation to the present.”24 Through this “spatial contiguity,” each museum
palimpsestuously layers the history of conflict with various regimes of memory and retro-
spective affective associations. As Laurie Beth Clark reminds us, the spatial remnants of con-
flict “do not do their work metonymically, that is, they do not stand in for the bodies of
victims. Rather, they work affectively . . . deploying the visible residue of that trauma on the
landscape.”25 This catalyzes some of the complexities of these museums, because it implies a
particular claim to authenticity that non-site-specific monuments cannot access, yet more
urgently poses the question of what an “authentic” narrative might tell us of the history of
conflict by provoking a diverse and unpredictable affective response. In other words,
through its spatial and affective work, the contiguity between content and context is likely
to expand, rather than curb, the various reactions that each site might evoke in visitors.
Mleeta, “where the land speaks to the heavens”
Located on the decommissioned site of military clashes between Lebanese and Israeli
fighters in the south of Lebanon, the Mleeta Resistance Tourist Landmark presents itself
as a “natural museum.”26 This evokes both its relationship to the mountainous land-
scape that surrounds it and the “naturalized” congruence between site and ideological
message that the museum promotes. Inaugurated by the Lebanese political party and
militia group Hezbollah in May 2010 (on the 10th anniversary of the south’s liberation
from Israeli occupation), the museum rehabilitates the pathways and tunnels used by
Hezbollah fighters against Israeli forces. Indoor exhibition spaces and a cinema room
showcase weaponry, artifacts, and photographs, while landscaped outdoor sections
include viewing platforms giving onto the surrounding mountains, and a sculptural
installation known as the Abyss. Argued by Mona Harb and Lara Deeb to play an
important role in Hezbollah’s creation of an “Islamic milieu” in Lebanon, Mleeta
“brings history, memory and entertainment together and allows [visitors] to walk in the
path of the fighters they admire and incorporate pride in the resistance into their senses
of self.”27 Mleeta memorializes conflict and occupation in the south primarily through
the narrative of Hezbollah’s success in liberating the region from Israeli occupation and
its ongoing legitimacy as a protector of Lebanese territory. As elaborated in the intro-
ductory film, the museum narrates conflict at Mleeta within a continuous history of
Israeli threat and Arab resistance dating back to 1948, incorporating the 1978 Israeli
invasion of Lebanon and the 2006 conflict, when the enemy fell into a military and
moral “abyss.” The museum’s architectural and curatorial design produces a site that
can be “acted out”—or, more specifically in this case, reenacted—by visitors identifying
with the resistance fighters who inhabited it, as well as a broader sentiment of Islamic
resistance to Zionism.
Entering the site through an archway on which the museum’s tagline “Where the
Land Speaks to the Heavens” (hikayat al-‘ard lil -sama) is emblazoned, visitors are first
guided toward a group of low-rise buildings, housing an auditorium in the visitors’ cen-
ter where one can watch a film narrated by Hezbollah’s secretary general Hassan
Nasrallah, and an exhibition space. The architecture of these buildings, as well as the
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4 C. LARKIN AND E. PARRY-DAVIES
archway at the entrance, makes use of sharp diagonals and tilted, irregular shapes, of
which the head architect Hajj ‘Adil has stated: “We brought in the military by using
diagonal walls, tilted ceilings, irregular openings, deep windows. We wanted to show
how architecture can challenge straight lines, just like resistance challenged the ene-
my.”28 While this seeks to symbolize and embody the spatial principles and expertise of
the resistance, it also recalls the distinctive jagged architecture of other museums dealing
with histories of conflict and genocide, notably including Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish
Museum, which opened in Berlin in 2001. ‘Adil notes that the architectural team
surveyed museums in the United States and Europe, including Holocaust museums,
suggesting that Mleeta positions itself in relation to other war museums worldwide,
and more pointedly through contesting or competing with the predominance of
Holocaust memorials.
Following this section, visitors pass the Abyss, an installation comprising an Israeli
Merkava-4 tank and multiple weapons; sculptures, such as a spider’s web and destroyed
Hebrew lettering (the acronym for the Israel Defense Forces); and scattered IDF boots
and helmets. Given what Harb and Deeb describe as Mleeta’s implication in a
“transnational war of memory and history” as a “direct response to holocaust museums
around the world,”29 these latter objects may or may not deliberately recall iconic
images of piles of shoes and other items of clothing stacked by the Nazis in concentra-
tion camps. Activating the visitor’s imagination through suggestion, their emptiness is
more, not less, evocative of the bodies that would have worn them. Tour guides explain
the symbolism of many of the objects: the spider’s web, for example, represents the fra-
gility of Israeli military force. The Abyss is said to be visible to Israeli satellites and
planes, and presents a vivid depiction of resistance might and Israeli downfall. Visitors
continue along a path through the trees, guided by panels in Arabic and English, and
through tunnels dug by the resistance, passing bunkers, a kitchen, and a prayer room.
The visit culminates at a large viewing platform at Mleeta’s highest point before passing
by the gift shop on the way out.
The land itself plays a key role in the ideological work of the museum; indeed, land-
scape may be a more suitable term for the natural environment experienced at Mleeta.
This distinction suggests that “the ‘nature’ that is landscape’s subject is never free from
cultural coding” and that landscape is as much a discourse as an originary environ-
ment.30 Mleeta’s personifying tagline, “Where the Land Speaks to the Heavens,” scripts
the land itself into the narrative presented. Visitors are prompted to view the mountains
from locations affording splendid perspectives, such as the Lookout, an airy viewing
platform giving onto villages that, the panel states, were liberated by the resistance from
Israel in 1985. This is accompanied by the story of the martyr Sayyid Abbas al
Moussawi’s death in 1992, “preserving the Resistance.” A long flight of steps to Martyr’s
Hill, a large viewing platform offering stunning 360-degree views of the mountains, con-
cludes visitors’ experience. In both cases, messages invoking sacrifice for the liberation
and preservation of the Lebanese territory are underscored by idyllic perspectives over
the hills and villages of the south and the journey visitors make from the dark spaces
of the tunnels and pathways to the symbolic light and sense of futurity and hope lent
by the striking views. Mleeta also functions, then, as a “supernatural” site—a space
where sacrifice and martyrdom have sanctified and redeemed the land, creating a closer
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proximity to heaven. The inscription at the top of Martyr’s Hill commemorates not
only a national restoration of the homeland but also a spiritual liberation: “the blood on
this field triumphs over the sword . . . the blood shattered all the shackles.”31
The naturalness of this memorial site is also constructed through the relationship it
presents between the location itself and the ideological message it conveys. In other
words, the site-specificity of the museum works toward naturalizing (disguising) its
ideological work. Stories suggesting that fighters were sheltered by the natural environ-
ment and their unique knowledge of the terrain contribute to a “discourse about the
organic relationship of Resistance to land and nature.”32 Visitors are repeatedly
reminded that they are standing on the actual site of the resistance, not least by
Nasrallah himself, who begins the introductory film’s narration: “Here, on the very land
that you stand on, the resistance fought and withstood.” The museum presents spaces
and artifacts as remnants of historical action: one guide pointed out an exploded cluster
bomb, which he noted had been used by the Israelis, evidence of their violation of inter-
national human rights law. Walking “in the path of the fighters they admire,” visitors
situate themselves both spatially and ideologically within the legacy of the resistance.
The visual strategies of the introductory film (e.g., filming through the weapon focal-
izers that are later physically re-encountered in the tunnels) immerse the viewer per-
spectivally, and by extension discursively, within the material and ideological history of
the site. Both the evidence and affect of this history are immanent to the environment
around us.
Mleeta balances care for the visitor (e.g., through direction from signs and tour
guides, and through water fountains) with a level of physical hardship resulting from
the heat and hilly terrain. This heightens the persuasiveness afforded by reenacting
movement through the terrain and physically empathizing with the struggle of the
resistance fighters. Along the paths and in the tunnels, lifelike mannequins of fighters
occupy scenographies of flags, weaponry, and supplies. A newly opened Simulation
Centre (summer 2018) further enables visitors to take up arms in a first-person shooter,
multiscreen military simulation to defend Lebanon against an inevitable future Israeli
invasion. Combining elements of reenactment, symbolism, and evidentiary material,
then, Mleeta invites the visitor to participate in staging a richly personal relationship to
the history of the site.
Beit beirut: the urban fragments of war
If the site-specificity of the Mleeta landmark functions to legitimize a dominant narra-
tive of the past, that of Beit Beirut is far more ambiguous. Beit Beirut occupies a reno-
vated villa dating from 1924, known as the Barakat Building (after the family who
commissioned its design), situated on the northeast corner of the Sodeco crossroad on
the Green Line of civil war demarcation. Offering a 270-degree perspective over the
crossroad, the building was occupied by Lebanese Forces snipers during the war and
suffered extensive material damage. In 2003, the Barakat building was expropriated on
the grounds of public interest, and architect Youssef Haidar’s renovation finally began
in 2012, funded by Beirut’s city council with guidance from the Mairie de Paris, the
Institut Français, and a scientific committee made up of members from the cultural,
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
6 C. LARKIN AND E. PARRY-DAVIES
academic, and civil society sectors. The restoration stabilized the structure and created
high-specification facilities for exhibition and events inside the building, but much of
the damage to the fabric has been kept visible.
Curators and artists working in the building have engaged in diverse ways with—and
elicited varied responses to—its history. Scientific committee member Mona el Hallak, a
high-profile campaigner for Beit Beirut, has given guided tours in the building alongside
her exhibition of photographs, The Photo Mario Project. The first artistic exhibition to
take place there, Sacred Catastrophe: Healing Lebanon by the visual and performance
artist Zena el Khalil, addressed the building’s associations with the civil war directly
through a 40-day installation of artworks, performances, and workshops (18 September
to 27 October 2017). Following this, the Arab Fund for Arts and Culture held a 10-year
anniversary celebration at Beit Beirut in the form of a two-week exhibition curated by
Rasha Salti (7–25 November 2017). Inviting more than 40 artists from 15 Arab coun-
tries, the exhibition leaned into its esthetic to gesture toward “the architectural incarna-
tion of an allegory of Lebanon’s Civil War, and perhaps the region’s embattled
contemporary reality.”33 Both the interdisciplinary exhibition Shifting Lights
(7 December 2017 to 2 January 2018) and the solo exhibition that followed it, Beirut:
Echo of the Silence by Brahim Samaha (1–15 February 2018), used light as a metaphor
for political instability, yet although Shifting Lights encouraged personal introspection
stimulated by the “wounds” of the building, neither exhibition substantively fore-
grounded the building’s particular history.34 Intercalated by an exhibition to celebrate
the fashion designer Elie Saab’s new dedicated postage stamp (31 March 2018), Haneen
(21 February to 4 March 2018) and Nazra (from 15 May 2018) have both staged explo-
rations of war memory in Lebanon, comprising exhibitions accompanied by events or
discussions; the latter (with German funding) regrouped organizations, including the
UNDP in Lebanon, the Lebanese Association for History, Committee of the Families of
Kidnapped and the Disappeared in Lebanon, Fighters for Peace, and International
Center for Transitional Justice. More recently, regular events, including book launches
and sales for products from mosaics to designer scarves, would suggest that the space is
used more for commercial hire than pedagogical curation.
For some of these interventions, the Barakat building provides an atmospheric back-
drop that lends a certain political urgency to exhibitions with only tangential connec-
tions to the histories of the space and the city. Such examples may imbue them with a
polyvalent association with the civil war that remains inclusive and open-ended, or
draw on the building’s history to make broader comments on political volatility in the
region. However, they also risk divorcing the esthetics of the space from the circum-
stances of its dilapidation, inducting the building into the same economy of nostalgia
that underlies much dark tourism in Lebanon.
The history of the space has been more directly confronted by interventions such as
Nazra, The Photo Mario Project, and Sacred Catastrophe: Healing Lebanon. The Photo
Mario Project displays a selection of some 10,000 negatives found in a photography stu-
dio that occupied one of the ground-floor shops in the building before the civil war. The
exhibition has much in common with other works by Lebanese artists of the wartime
generation that are based on found images—either real or imagined—and an interroga-
tion of the historiographical concerns of the archive.35 Inviting visitors to “adopt” one of
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NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 7
the portraits in search of the characters and stories it represents, el Hallak’s exhibition
asks: “How can we engage the public in researching this archive, and through their
research connect them to the city and its memory?”36 Albeit within a framework of col-
lective participation, the work thus invites a largely individualized, speculative engage-
ment with prewar images. To an extent, this exhibition reclaims the building from its
history of conflict into a celebration of the fashionable cosmopolitanism of mid-century
Beirut, indexed by the stylized studio portraits: the civil war is mentioned only as a “time
of resilience.”37 While el Hallak’s fervent protection of and research on the building
would suggest a more directly activist project, such recourse to prewar narratives of the
city has also been the focus of nostalgic imaginaries that elide the social inequalities pre-
sent on the eve of the war, emphasizing a largely middle- and upper-class experience
that draws attention away from the causes of the war.
Zena el Khalil’s Sacred Catastrophe: Healing Lebanon was in turn more direct in
addressing histories of violence. Alongside other works in el Khalil’s exhibition, 17,000
x Forgiveness, a large “forest” of green poles on the second and third floors, was
installed in memory of the 17,000 people “disappeared” in the war, also evoking the
foliage that gave the Green Line its name. The relative abstraction of such an installa-
tion, however, as well as el Khalil’s chosen mantras of “love, compassion and for-
giveness,” position her work within a universal humanist paradigm that arguably makes
an exhibition such as Sacred Catastrophe acceptable (if not uncontroversial) to the state
administration. In her view, that the intervention took the form of an artwork also
helped it to pass below the political radar:
It’s a controversial topic, the disappeared. Because who made the people disappear? The
people who are in public office today. . . . [But] I wonder if, in general, people in Lebanon
still think that art is not such a big deal. That they undermine it: it’s just art.38
The views of those who have chosen to attend or avoid Beit Beirut have been varied.
El Khalil describes young visitors born after the end of the war not recognizing the
symbol of the Lebanese Forces on the walls and asking her the religion of the fighters:
“And I’d always tell them, it doesn’t matter, because this house is just like many other
houses. So, we’re not going to just identify one religion today. It doesn’t matter if they
were Christian or Muslim.”39 Visitors with first-hand or more partisan associations,
however, brought their own stories to the space, such as a woman who remembered
bringing food to the fighters in the building, or a former sniper who fought in the
building as a teenager in the 1970s. According to the artist, the exhibition and work-
shops elicited suppressed discussions between friends who had no idea what the other
had experienced during the war and repeated visits from neighboring residents.
Through the exhibition, el Khalil sought to offer healing through closure and to
encourage visitors to share untold stories, both of violence and acts of kindness.
“Everybody wants to talk about the war,” she argues. “Everybody has something to talk
about. But there is no space, there is no platform, there is no community center, there
is no environment where real discussions can be had. But within this space, Beit Beirut,
discussions were coming up, confessions were coming up, release was coming
through.”40 Despite any narrative that an exhibition or even permanent archival content
in the museum might steer, however, the building has its own significations that are
deeply personal. As one survey respondent confessed: “I couldn’t care less about the
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8 C. LARKIN AND E. PARRY-DAVIES
exhibition to be honest. I was only interest[ed] in touring the building and I did”41; for
another, the continuing presence of the ruins themselves is the most powerful and
impactful reminder. While in el Khalil’s account and in the ambitions of civil society
players working in the space Beit Beirut offers opportunities for memory-sharing across
sectarian divisions, the powerful affects of the space—its testimonies to extensive and
largely unaccounted for acts of violence—could also have unpredictable and incendiary
potential. As one respondent described: “The energy I felt inside the space was almost
suffocating.”
The disruptive power of the building’s past is also matched by the socio-spatial sig-
nificance and volatility of its location along Beirut’s former Green Line. A political fall-
out in January 2018 between Amal (Nabih Berri) and FPM politicians (foreign minister
Gebran Bassil) about leaked video insults resulted in Amal supporters engaging in street
protests, road blockades, and tire burning in Mar Elias, Ras al-Nabaa, and Bechara al-
Khoury, which runs alongside Beit Beirut.42 As Lebanese politicians and the army
scrambled to defuse urban tensions, it is evident that old fractures and rupture sites can
be quickly imbued with fresh crises.
Umam: archiving the civil war
Unlike the other museums, Umam’s memorial site is both physical and virtual. The
organization’s base and material archive is located within a traditional Lebanese villa
compound in Haret Hreik, in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahiyya). Established in 2004
by German filmmaker Monika Borgmann and Lebanese publisher and activist Lokman
Slim, the emerging “citizen archive,” a collation of newspapers, journals, and memoirs,
has informed workshops, films, public discussions, and exhibitions held in an adjoining
gallery space called The Hangar. The intended aim of Umam is the creation of a citizen
resource center, which “helps boost collective reflection on the many different instances
of conflict and violence that have plagued Lebanon’s past, weigh heavily on its present
and have the potential to influence its future.”43
Alongside Umam’s material archive is the more recent addition of a digital web-based
portal titled “Memory at Work: A Guide for Lebanese on Peace and War.”44 According
to its website, this project (which is “under constant construction”) aims to provide a
dynamic “radical criticism” of the civil war through the creation of a repository of
diverse voices and images.45 The bilingual database contains video clips of historic bat-
tles, interviews with combatants and civil society initiatives, alongside archival sections
documenting Lebanese war memorials, political assassinations, the “disappeared,”
amnesty laws, war fronts, and maps of mass graves sites.46 For some of our Lebanese
survey respondents, this project is long overdue and has the potential to create a collect-
ive, pluralistic database unhindered by local sensibilities or territorial divides. “I salute
the initiative. It’s a mammoth enterprise that needs to be undertaken, and the existing
[website] is the tip of the iceberg . . . Memory at Work needs more exposure and
deserves more attention from the public.” Other respondents, however, raised concerns
about the private nature of Umam D&R and the potential agendas of its international
sponsors (such as Heinrich B€oll, EuropeAid, and Canada Fund), the tight control over
who uploads material, and its apparent Western-leaning perspective: “it seems like it is
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designed by someone who doesn’t live here.” Such criticisms may reflect deeper con-
cerns about foreign interference and political agendas; yet, a de-territorialized war mem-
ory archive does not alleviate questions about accessibility, control, and which war
narratives are privileged.
If “Memory at Work” offers an online portal into Lebanon’s contested past as “the
first virtual museum of the Lebanese Civil War,”47 Umam’s organizational base in the
predominantly Shia suburb and Hezbollah stronghold of Haret Hreik speaks of a very
contemporary struggle over urban imaginaries and political control. Umam occupies the
family villa of Lokman Slim, a gardened and walled property whose mandaloun-style
Ottoman windows look out onto the densely populated high-rise neighborhood of
Dahiyya. The villa is not a traumatic memorial site but, rather, a space that has with-
stood war, displacement, the transforming power of extensive Shi’i migration (Bekka
and the south), and Hezbollah’s political and administrative consolidation of the sub-
urb.48 According to the Slims the building’s historical longevity bears material witness
to a bygone cosmopolitan Beiruti past where the Slim family (parliamentarian Mohsen
Slim) would host parties for local and foreign dignitaries and the home would be an
open space for communal discussion and debate.49 In this sense, the villa that houses
the organization’s physical war archives exemplifies Umam’s memorial project of exca-
vating a lost, neglected past and providing a space for critical historical narratives amid
its increasingly sectarian environs. As Katherine Maddox notes: “The house embodies
the future the organization wishes to project as well as a version of the past.”50
For Lokman Slim, Umam’s strategic location is not just about nostalgic longing but a
recognition of Dahiyya’s increasing importance within contemporary Beirut and wider
Lebanon: “What is today central? Is Downtown [Beirut] central politically-wise, or
Haret Hreik? I think we are much more central in all senses. Dahiyya is much more
central because it has this value of at the same time fascination and fear.”51 Dahiyya’s
centrality for Slim is linked to Hezbollah’s growing orbit of power within Lebanese pol-
itics—“we are a country which is itself under occupation.” This is also felt through the
Party’s everyday inculcation of an Islamic urban milieu in the southern suburbs,
embraced by their supporters as pious resistance and rejected by others as sectarian
hegemony. Umam’s secular and liberal credentials (serving alcohol, screening controver-
sial films) challenge the religious conservatism of their neighborhood; more signifi-
cantly, memorial projects such as “Collecting Dahiyya” provide alternative historical
narratives that subvert Hezbollah’s totalizing accounts. This exhibition, held in the after-
math of Israel’s destructive 2006 war, included posters, photos, interviews, Dahiyehscope
(a series of short films shot during the war), and an interactive whiteboard map that
encouraged guests to contribute to the dynamic recreation of the southern neighbor-
hood. The testimonies and stories of Christian inhabitants before the civil war empha-
sized the homogenizing logic of displacement and sectarian ghettoization. As Slim
explained to a local newspaper reporter at the opening of the exhibition: “I don’t want
to live in a country that is a collection of Dahiyehs, yet I see that’s what’s happening.
Without making an effort Dahiyeh has become the mirror of what . . . Tariq al-Jadideh,
Chouf and others are becoming.”52
Umam’s interventions provide a dynamic and shifting memorial landscape, one that
seeks to entwine historic material archives (Villa Slim) and artistic engagement through
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exhibitions, installations, and cultural events in The Hangar. The Hangar, as Maddox
explains, is a “space where ‘fictional potentialities’ and ‘interpretations of fact’ that arise
from the contestation of the nation are addressed through artistic and cultural interven-
tions with the hope of arriving at some definite answer.”53 The fusion of material sour-
ces and imaginative interpretation represent the challenge of reconstructing the
Lebanese past within a very precarious present. Monika Borgmann’s story of Umam’s
encounter with the Ain el-Remmaneh bus is indicative of this struggle:
For three years between 2011 and 2013, the famous bus of Ain el-Remmaneh was in
UMAM. The civil war started with an accident with a bus. So, this bus was here. It was
first part of an exhibition we organized, then the exhibition after two months ended the
real bus stayed here in our place . . . We found the bus ourselves, the bus was in the
South. We brought it here, and then it stayed. And as it was attracting huge amount of
people, a lot of press and so on, today’s owner thought he could make a lot of money with
it. So, he asked us to buy the bus for US$200,000. Which we didn’t have, of course. So, he
took his bus back. Now it’s somewhere in the South.54
Umam’s recovery and display of the bullet-ridden bus was inspired and accompanied
by Houssam Boukeili’s artistic exhibition of silkscreen prints of Lebanese buses, A Bus
and its Replicas (2011). Viewers were invited to make “critical leaps between memory
repositories and artifacts assembled,”55 yet the activist–artist collaboration also raised
questions of appropriation. As Borgmann recounts, the discovery of this infamous war
relic did not lead to official preservation but, rather, resulted in a private dispute over
its financial value and ownership. Boukeili recalls a heated argument between the
current bus owner and the son of the former bus driver, upset that the bus had
not been passed on to him: “But why are you talking about my father? You do
not know my father, it is our history.”56 Such memorial exhibitions not only
provoke debates about who has the right to tell Lebanon’s violent histories
but also reveal the emotive power of war artifacts to disturb and challenge pre-
sent realities.
Narratives and nation
With the exception of the city council’s somewhat inconsistent guardianship of Beit
Beirut, none of the memorial museums under review are officially state sponsored or
administrated sites, yet they cannot be disentangled from nationalist claims. The
absence of the Lebanese state is a common postwar lament, but in the case of each
museum there is a negotiation of the state’s (failed) role retold through memorial
practice.57 At Mleeta, Hezbollah assumes the role of Lebanon’s national defender
against Israeli aggression, a consequence of the military failings of the state apparatus.
Umam takes up the mantle of archivists responding to the state’s deliberate
obfuscation of national war memory. Beit Beirut, in its incomplete status, indicates a
Lebanese state willing to acknowledge the urban legacy of violence but reluctant to take
responsibility for a critical historical examination of the past. Each memorial museum
thus provides a complex snapshot of the ongoing debates surrounding Lebanon’s post-
war politics.
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Wayn al-Dawala? Where is the state?
During Mleeta’s inaugural year (2010–2011), the site was visited by former Lebanese
president Emile Lahoud and tourism minister Fadi Abboud, and was embraced as part
of the national tourist development plan for south Lebanon. Alternating Lebanese and
Hezbollah flags flanked the entrance and stood side by side on the hilltop lookout, sym-
bolizing the complementarity of both the Lebanese state and the Islamic resistance.
Eight years later, only Hezbollah flags adorn Mleeta’s entrance and the hilltop.58
Memorabilia intermingling Lebanese and Hezbollah colors can still be purchased in the
gift shop, but the nation state is less visible in the esthetic contours of this memorial
site. This symbolic decision undoubtedly reflects the complexity of Hezbollah’s relation-
ship with the state since their unsanctioned military involvement in the Syrian civil war
in early 2013. It may be interpreted as an attempt to uncouple Hezbollah’s resistance
operations from the Lebanese government’s “disassociation” policy in Syria.
Alternatively, it may simply reflect the Party’s growing self-confidence that it does not
need to prove its Lebanese credentials or indeed share its military victories with the
Lebanese state. The latter reading supports Mleeta’s overall resistance narrative, which
exclusively privileges Hezbollah and erases all other Lebanese resistance histories (such
as those of Amal, SSNP, and the Communist Party). Mleeta’s curation and introductory
film eschews Hezbollah’s emergence and involvement in the Lebanese civil war, but
rather imagines it solely as a liberatory people’s movement engaged in an existential
battle with an Israeli Zionist enemy that goes beyond national borders and state sover-
eignties. As Hatim el-Hibri explains: “The museum’s task is twofold—to give institu-
tional form to the party’s (and therefore the people’s) history of guerilla resistance to
Israeli occupation, while at the same time making the claim that this specific history is
one of national or even universal significance.”59 Hezbollah’s current military engage-
ment in Syria, absent from the discourse at Mleeta, is similarly framed as a fight to pro-
tect the Lebanese State (and all of its people) through an existential battle against
another exclusionary ideology threatening the Middle East: “Salafi takfiri terrorism.”60
The Mleeta museum has a claim on Lebanon’s future as well as its past. Its key ideo-
logical imperative is to promote Hezbollah’s ongoing necessity in continued resistance
to Israel. As much as the spaces, artifacts, and audiovisual material make use of eviden-
tiary and symbolic tropes to persuade visitors of a certain narrative of the past, so they
must also tell a particular story about the future. In the words of our survey respond-
ents, Mleeta “helps to keep the creation of an enemy happening”; “You come out [from
the museum] ready to fight for your rights”; “It not only recounts past history but the
present and all the propaganda that goes with it.”
Truth telling from below
Umam presents itself as cultural custodian of Lebanese war archives, independent from
the state and antithetical to the ongoing policy of public censure and denial: “the collec-
tion being built by UMAM D&R is destined for Lebanon’s public, and . . . is open to
everyone without the restrictions imposed by State or academic entities.”61 In this, civil
society is seen as autonomous and separate to the state. Umam is certainly a challenger
of the Lebanese political establishment, yet its commitment to promote debate and
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public discussion of the civil war (and its legacy) through “multiple narratives” of the
past is not without agency or political intent. In the organization’s own words, it seeks
to challenge “the country’s faulty national memory” and provide a platform “upon
which to assess and help deal with Lebanon’s current problems and challenges.” A num-
ber of Umam’s projects shift between past and present temporal frames, moving from
“truth seeking” to “truth telling,” addressing the Lebanese disappeared (Missing, 2008),
war crimes and amnesties (What Is to Be Done? Lebanon’s War-Loaded Memory,
2008–2009), military (in)justice (Martial Justice for All? Lebanon’s Military Court: A
“State of Martial Law” within a “State of Law,” 2014–2015), and peace initiatives (Peace
upon You: Revisiting Past Attempts to End Lebanon’s Conflicts, 2015–2016).62 Two more
recent projects directly confront the most pressing and sensitive of national topics:
Syrian refugees and the nature of the Lebanese state. Most Welcomed? Lebanon through
its Refugees, a series of papers and public workshops held in 2017–2018, offered a crit-
ical examination of Lebanon’s historic positions on asylum and refugees, seeking to
move the debate beyond security concerns and economic cost and instead suggesting
that the polarizing and partisan disputes about refugees represents “an integral compo-
nent of the enduring debate over Lebanese national identity.”63
Umam projects are not explicitly policy orientated, yet the cannot be dissociated
from secular liberal politics seeking to challenge Lebanon’s postwar sectarian status quo.
Equally, while representing local voices and interests, Umam remains dependent on
international funding and is therefore responsive to donor research agendas and global
trends. The neoliberal influx of foreign capital into Lebanon following the end of the
civil war (1990) and the Syrian withdrawal (2005) created new dependencies, audiences,
and discourses for civil society and artistic initiatives. As Hanan Toukan persuasively
argues, a 1990s and early 2000s cohort of Lebanese artists and cultural organizations
“tied itself to international funding for cultural production and embedded itself within a
process of producing and international exhibiting that valorizes culture . . . a profession-
alized form of art where, some have argued, politics becomes the art of display.”64 This
trend is perhaps evidenced by Umam’s privileging of the English language in publica-
tions, public events, and on their website (although Arabic translations are available for
some of the work), or, indeed, reflected in recent internationally funded projects on
Syrian prisons and prisoners (Shared Suffering: Exploring the Abyss of Syrian Prisons,
2012–2013) and the construction of a new online database Memory at Work Syria: A
Toolbox for Rethinking Syria (2014– ) sponsored by IFA and the German Federal
Foreign Office. The professionalization, or “NGO-ization,” of civil society initiatives, as
Hammami warns from the Palestinian context, can both de-politicize and distance
organizations from their social bases, who become “social groups in need of instruction”
rather than “constituencies from which they take their direction and legitimacy.”65
Umam D&R’s truth telling from below is certainly complicated by its funding from
barra (outside), while its commitment to instruct and “guide” Lebanese into new narra-
tives of the past seeks to affect real change in the present. This is not to critique
Umam’s postwar contribution, but rather to identify that its memorial work is invested
in reaffirming a cosmopolitan and pluralistic form of Lebanese nationalism. Among
many of our Lebanese respondents, Umam still offers the greatest potential as a
war memorial initiative, but it also requires an “expanded database,” which is fully
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“open-sourced,” providing more space for the uploading of everyday “stories, pictures,
diary records, newspaper articles that would give even more details about
what happened.”
Political stickiness
While Beit Beirut advertises itself as a museum and urban cultural center, it is not cur-
rently operating as such, a conundrum indicative of what el Khalil euphemistically
terms the “political stickiness” of state involvement in the project.66 A competitive bid
was held for curatorship of the space, and although a winner was selected a contract
was never signed. The space is therefore ready, but lacking a permanent curator, and
administrative and logistical delays are suspected by some to belie political unwilling-
ness. As described earlier, a number of artistic and archival exhibitions have since taken
place with varied relationships to the space, the history of Beirut, and the civil war
(or none at all), but at the time of writing there is no permanent museum content and
much of the building lies empty.
The reemergence of war actors as part of the contemporary government makes the
histories of violence told by the museum potentially irreconcilable with state narratives
of willful forgetting. To install a permanent exhibition in Beit Beirut—that is, to turn
the building from a memorial site into a museum—would be a radical step toward an
official history of the civil war. In el Khalil’s words, through the involvement of the city
council, “the government’s face is on this building.”67 Not only would it be near impos-
sible to agree on what this narrative should recount (given ongoing political-sectarian
division concerning war history at both party-political and popular levels), it would also
implicate the state in acknowledging the violent past of the present political elite. As
Umam’s director Lokman Slim regretfully stated of Beit Beirut: “We don’t have any pol-
icy to deal with the legacy of violence in this country. How can we imagine that such a
project will find its way? The whole system finally is based on amnesia, just turning the
page, non-accountability. It doesn’t work, it’s just delusional.”68 While individual play-
ers, such as the exhibiting artists, sympathetic civil society organizations, campaigners,
and others, might express a certain position or narrative vis-"a-vis the war through per-
sonal projects and temporary interventions in the space, it is yet to be seen whether the
museum can or will accommodate any permanent historical content under its official
pedagogical remit, and thus whether the narrative(s) it presents will stake any claim to
national representation.
While the building is officially (and financially) in the care of the city council, the
effort of el Hallak and the scientific committee was most visibly behind the expropri-
ation and restoration, and Beit Beirut remains widely understood as a civil society pro-
ject rather than a state one. As one survey respondent expressed, the restoration of Beit
Beirut “is in contrast with the erasure of the war from the Beirut city center. So also
political in many ways, maybe catering more towards the bourgeoisie left—with its arts
exhibitions and programing.” In this case, and similarly to Umam, Beit Beirut is seen as
diverging from the state’s approach to war memory, not least as a building that has
been restored with the signs of violence left intact, rather than reconstructed in the
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Solidere fashion. Yet for this respondent, its programing remains political in leaning
toward the (“bourgeoisie left”) agenda of a middle-class civil society constituency.
However, universal, humanistic rhetorics can help to disguise politics. El Khalil’s
thinking on this issue is revealing: “Whoever becomes the curator is in a position of
great responsibility. Because they’re telling the story of the city. You see I just assumed
that it would be, like, one of us, you know? One of the good guys! But what if it
wasn’t?”69 The apparently unificatory narrative of Beirut’s history (the “good” and
“right” narrative: “peace and love”) seems to achieve transparency as the appropriate
history of the city thanks to its apparently inclusive and conciliatory stance. Yet while a
number of the survey respondents suggested that a national museum of the civil war
should be managed by institutions such as the Ministry of Education or the nonprofit
and civil society sectors, none of these can be realistically considered apolitical nor dis-
interested in the implications of war memory in Lebanon today. The impasse at which
Beit Beirut finds itself is indicative of the contemporary politics of war memory in
Lebanon in which neither party, nor state, nor civil society is neutral, and in which nei-
ther reconstructed downtown Beirut nor the Green Line are universally experienced as
accessible sites of encounter.
Whether the historiographical ambivalence of many of the exhibitions at Beit Beirut
is employed strategically to induct political statements into the space “under the radar,”
the arts have been invoked as inclusive terrains on which remembering can take place
without directly undermining the current regime. However, artworks and events curated
in Beit Beirut hold messages and invitations to their viewers that are socially situated,
selective, and ultimately cannot avoid being political in nature. Despite the ambiguous
metaphors of light and sound in Echo of the Silence; the attention to personal, subjective
narratives invited by The Photo Mario Project; or the focus on universalist themes of
love, compassion, and forgiveness espoused by Sacred Catastrophe, such interventions
may well activate an array of unforeseeable responses from visitors inspired toward
accountability, reconciliation, or political action in Lebanon, particularly for those with
first-hand memories of the civil war. El Khalil’s account of a former sniper’s experience
of her exhibition in Beit Beirut attests to this:
Everybody who came, came because they needed to vent about the war, they needed to
share, they needed to communicate, to connect, they needed to release. There was a sniper
who used to fight there in the late ‘70s, and he hadn’t come back since then. During the
exhibition it was the first time he came through since he was 18 years old, 16 I think,
fighting there. He came in with his daughter, and it was a very big deal for him. And he
took her around and he showed her everything, and at the end he came and introduced
himself to me. And I was very surprised that he would openly say, I used to fight here. No
remorse in his voice. I told him why, you know, what made you carry a gun? And he said,
for love. Love of my people and our way of life. Against the other. And for him at that
time the other were the Palestinians. . . . And he thanked me, because when you first walk
in on the first floor there was a huge sculpture on the floor that said “Forgiveness”. There
were tiles with the word “Forgiveness” printed 108 times. So that’s the first thing you see
when you walk into the big space. And he said, I walked in and you forgave me.70
Such an encounter of forgiveness and closure allows for a discussion about the war to
take place without concrete demands for social justice or change in Lebanon. The
approach does not insist on the link between the wartime history of Beirut and the
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aftermaths experienced by Lebanese youth: the injustices permitted by the Amnesty,
political corruption and deadlock, breakdowns in public services, and widespread social
inequality. Narratives of universal forgiveness—reconciliation without accountability—
therefore risk failing to place young people in Lebanon in a position of informed agency
with regard to the current political regime and the future of the nation.
Conclusion
To take these three case studies together evidences the still-contested nature of war
memory in Lebanon. As members of the first generation to be born after the civil war
now come of age as key stakeholders in the future of the nation, no clear way of mov-
ing forward with shared narratives of the past is evident. As has been widely agreed
since the early 1990s, the absence of coherent memory at a national level has led to the
proliferation of narratives at the level of the family, neighborhood, and party as well as
among a largely middle-class civil society struggling to represent national interests. As
Hermez provocatively suggests, “civil society ensured the continual recollection of
Lebanon’s war into the present, but unable to deal with the war’s causes, facilitated
war’s anticipation into the future.”71 These war museums attest to diverging accounts
and strategies. Mleeta attempts to displace the legacy of a destructive and fractured civil
war with a triumphant liberatory struggle against Israel—the failure of the Lebanese
state replaced with the victory of the Islamic resistance. Umam seeks to uncover a sup-
pressed past that will both challenge the basis of Lebanon’s sectarian politics and offer
new ways forward. Beit Beirut, product of a decades-long struggle to preserve one of
the city’s most evocative monuments, must now find ways to make good on its peda-
gogical mission, even while negotiating the reluctance of the state to associate itself with
histories of civil violence.
As Bharucha has argued, “the prefix of ‘post-’ . . . is deceptive in so far as it implies a
clean break with the past, which, in actuality, continues to haunt the present through
lingering legacies of violence, humiliation, and injustice.”72 In Lebanon’s “post–”civil
war moment, the country is clearly haunted by the fragments, architectures, and stories
of past conflict, but it is also experiencing a present in which the political regimes that
fostered war are have been retained or recast. For Lebanese youth, this has produced
catastrophic levels of inequality, environmental damage, and political disenfranchise-
ment, all of which stand to be renegotiated by this generation through effective engage-
ment with the histories of the present. Interest in the three museums discussed here
points toward desire among Lebanese youth for national war museums that could
“bring together composite materials and multiple testimonies” from fighters, martyrs,
victims, and citizens. While most agree on the pedagogical purpose—“to educate about
the mistakes of the past,” “repentance and learning”—few, however, are ready to believe
in its political feasibility or public acceptance.
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